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1. William A. Hance & Irene S. Van Dongen, Matadi, Focus of Belgian African
Transport, 48 ANNALS OF THE ASS’N OF AM. GEOGRAPHERS 41 (1958).  There are
three maritime ports in the DRC that are used for international trade: Matadi, Boma, and
Banana.  Id.  Matadi, the most important of these three ports, is situated on a narrow land
corridor on the western edge of the Congo, giving the almost landlocked country access to
the Atlantic Ocean.  Id.
2. Onatra, Historique de l’Onatra, www.onatra.info/suite.php?newsid=8 (last visited
Mar. 30, 2009).
3. Id.
4. Although the name of this company has changed several times—from the Colonial
Transport Agency (Otraco) to Agency of Transports in Congo (Otraco) in 1960, then to the
National Agency of Transports (Onatra) in 1971—it remains, as it has been since 1935, a
State owned corporation.  Id.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has many ports, all of
which were built along the Congo River and its affluent.  Some of them are
used solely for domestic transport, while others are used for international
trade.1  The Congolese maritime ports that are used for international trade
were constructed along the Congo River during the colonial period and
have belonged to the Congolese government since 1935.2  Under State
control, these ports are run by the Office National des Transports (Onatra).3
Onatra, a Congolese public enterprise that specializes in transport, is
owned, in its entirety, by the Congolese government.4
Over the past few decades international trade and maritime ports, as
centers for the international transport of goods, have experienced
significant changes.  With the recent phenomena of containerization and
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5. Alan Harding et al., Port and Maritime Transport Challenges in West and Central
Africa, at ix (World Bank Sub-Saharan Afr. Transp. Policy Program, Working Paper No. 84,
2007). 
6. Raul Compes Lopez & Nigel Pool, Quality Assurance in the Maritime Port Logistics
Chain: The Case of Valencia, Spain, 3 J. SUPPLY CHAIN MGNT. 33, 34 (1998).
7. See Press Release, Ernesto Zedillo, President, Mex., Mexico Now Has a Modern and
Efficient Port System (Nov. 24, 1998), available at http://zedillo.presidencia.gob.mx/
welcome/bulletins/b1187.htm;  Manmohan Singh, Prime Minister, India, Speech at the
Foundation Stone Laying Ceremony of International Container Transshipment Terminal
(Feb. 16, 2005), available at  http://pmindia.nic.in/speech/content.asp?id=75; Peter Ong,
Chairman, Mar. & Port Auth. of  Sing., Address at the Second International Conference on
Port and Maritime R & D and Technology (Sept. 10, 2003), available at http://74.125.
93.104/custom?q=cache:g4Yu8AKUO4MJ:www.mpa.gov.sg/sites/pdf/030910a.pdf+tech
nological+advances&cd=6&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us&client=google-coop; Fotis Karamitsos,
Dir. Logistics, Innovation, Co-modality & Mar. Transp., European Comm’n, The New
European Ports Policy (Nov. 21, 2007), available at http://74.125.93.104/search?q=
cache:wpEBvC1wGkQJ:www.espo.be/downloads/archive/7f5c3616-e9f5-4acc-b706-
50a8d920f639.pdf+maritime+ports,+infrastructure,+modern,+europe&cd=17&hl=en&ct
=clnk&gl=us&client=firefox-a.
8. Harding et al., supra note 5, at 3. 
9. Id. at 45.  In fact, Sub-Saharan African Transport Policy Program (SSATPP)
conducted a study that indicates that “[n]ew trade patterns are emerging in Sub-Sahara
Africa with increasing trade in Asia and Latin America and decreasing trade with Europe.”
Id. at 1.
10. Id. 
11. Id. at 9.
globalization, the maritime transport sector has grown exponentially.5  As
a result, the efficiency of port industries has become increasingly important
to port users “for whom ports services have always constituted a bottleneck
in periods of rapid international trade.”6  In an effort to meet the needs of
this rapidly growing industry and satisfy the demand for increased
efficiency most maritime ports have invested in infrastructure and
technology renewal.7  The expansion and modernization of maritime ports
and changes in the shipping industry have resulted in a maritime transport
and management system that is characterized by “mega-carriers and mega-
ships calling at efficient mega-ports.”8
Globalization of trade and expansion of import-export activities in
Africa places many African countries, including the DRC, in a position to
be major players in the future of international trade.9  This is particularly
important to the DRC because increased trade “opens access to new
markets and opportunities . . . fostering [the] export-led economic growth
[that is] essential to alleviate poverty on a significant scale.”10  At the same
time, most African maritime ports are not equipped to satisfy the needs of
the globalized maritime sector.11   In addition, management, port access,
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12. Id. at 11.  
13. Hance & Van Dongen, supra note 1, at 45.  The construction of the Matadi maritime
port was finished in 1933.  Id.  The DRC gained independence from Belgium on June 30,
1960.  GEORGE WRIGHT, THE DESTRUCTION OF A NATION 25 (1997).
14. Hance & Van Dongen, supra note 1, at 45.  Port traffic, estimated at 530,567 metric
tons in 1938, increased to 1, 827,058 tons in 1955.  Id. 
15. See Harding et al., supra note 5, at 3.
16. Id. at 10.
security, and cost issues have had a negative impact on the number of ships
calling on these ports.  Consequently, the DRC’s maritime ports have been
marginalized in international trade.12  This Article outlines these issues in
greater detail and explores potential solutions to these problems.  In
addition, this Article calls for reforms to Onatra, evaluates the steps that the
Congolese government has already taken, and suggests alternatives for
improving management and attracting much needed capital. 
II. CHALLENGES FACING MARITIME PORTS AND TRANSPORT IN THE
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
The Congolese maritime ports, constructed at the beginning of the
twentieth century, are products of Belgian colonial power.13  Limited
resources have resulted in little renewal or development of these ports’
infrastructure since their construction in the 1930s. This has left the DRC’s
ports in a position where they are unable to respond to the needs of modern
international commerce.  As a result these ports have lost their ability to
compete in the world market.14  The major operational obstacles to
Congolese participation in international trade include an inability to process
containerized vessels, limited capacity, and an inability to address dredging
and navigational issues.  Further aggravating the situation is an increase in
freight rates.  Until each of these issues have been addressed, Congolese
ports will continue to be marginalized by major shippers. 
A. Operations
Containerization revolutionized maritime transport activities.15
However, because Western and Central African ports are unable to
efficiently process containerized goods “a commodity, which would be
shipped in a container from a Far Eastern or from a European port, may still
be carried in break-bulk from an African port.”16   As a result, the “contain-
erized rate of traffic in [Western and Central Africa (WCA)] remains low
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17. Id.  “In 2005, containerized traffic in West and Central Africa accounted for 0.6
percent of the world containerized traffic (0.75 percent in 1995). Africa’s container traffic
share has ranged from 0.6 percent to 0.85 percent in the last ten years.”  Id. 
18. See Harding et al., supra note 5, at xii-xiii.
19. Id. at 19.
20. Id. at 9.
21. World Investment News, Regie des Voies Maritimes, http://www.winne.com/congo
/reports/2005/cp/rvm/index.php (last visited Apr. 15, 2009).
22. See id.
23. Id.
24. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, WORLD TRADE REPORT 115 (2004).
25. Harding et al., supra note 5, at 17-18. 
and container traffic from or to Africa remains marginal in the world.”17
Despite the negative impact that obsolete infrastructure has had on trade,
Onatra has not thought seriously about investing in the equipment
necessary to efficiently process container vessels.  Until Congolese’s ports
adapt to the phenomenon of containerization they will be unable to compete
with other ports in the region and around the world.
In addition to out-of-date infrastructure, the limited capacity of WCA
and Congolese maritime ports makes it difficult for these ports to compete
with others in the region. WCA maritime ports are all small; mega-maritime
ports have not been necessary there because the volume of trade in the
countries is low.18  With most goods today being transported via mega-
container vessels, “[m]ajor ocean carriers may be reluctant to call at certain
[WCA] ports” because their limited capacity is likely to be associated with
”high turnaround time and poor port efficiency.”19
Finally, Congolese maritime ports are faced with maintenance,
dredging, and navigational challenges.20  The Regie des Voies Maritimes
(RVM) is the Congolese public enterprise in charge of dredging the Congo
River from the Atlantic Ocean to the port of Matadi.21  The agency, like
most public enterprises in the Congo, has limited to financial resources.22
Thus, much of the agency’s equipment, essential to maintaining the sea
lanes, is obsolete and in disrepair discouraging trade.23
B. Increased Freight Costs
Increased freight rates—a consequence of the imbalance between
imports and containerizable exports—are also having an adverse impact on
maritime transport in the region. Freight cost are highest for products with
a low value to weight ratio—i.e., agricultural and mining products.24  The
decline in the value of mining and agricultural end-products on the world
market has lead to increasingly higher shipping costs for these products.25
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26. Id. at 18.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 17.  “For the 30 most significant non-oil exports combined, SSA’s [Sub-
Saharan Africa] average market share declined from 20.8 percent in the 1960s to 9.7 percent
in 1990 of world exports of those products.”  Id. at 18.
29. Harding et al., supra note 5, at 17-18.  
30. See  id. at 17.
31. This change can be attributed in part to trade growth between African countries and
countries of the Far East and the appreciation of the Euro, which has diminished the
competitiveness of European products on the global market. See, e.g., Uwe Bower et al.,
Commodity Price Fluctuations and Their Impact on Monetary and Fiscal Policies in
Western and Central Africa (Euro. Cent. Bank, Working Paper No. 60, 2007).  Increased
trade with Asia can also be explained by the change in composition of exports from WCA
ports from fifty percent to eighty-five percent oil. Harding et al., supra note 5, at 17.
32. Harding et al., supra note 5, at 17.
33. John W. Miller, The Mega Containers Invade, WALL ST. J., Jan. 26, 2009, at B1. 
34. Harding et al., supra note 5, at 17.
35. See id. Although, congestion of the Congolese maritime ports is not new—the port
of Matadi, for example, has been experiencing problems with congestion since 1946—it
The majority of WCA countries rely extensively on the export of domestic
goods.26  For example, the WCA’s main exports—sugar, cocoa, coffee, tea,
cotton, forest products, iron ore, copper, and other minerals—“represent
more than 80 percent of the volume of non-oil export freight handled by
ports in WCA.”27   Consequently, the increased freight rates have lead to
“[t]he erosion of export volumes” handled by WCA ports over the past
decade.28
The decrease in the volume of exports has aggravated the already high
freight costs associated with increased trade with Asian mega-ships.
Despite an overall decline in export rates, trade activities between the DRC
and Asia have grown substantially over the past five years.29  Historically,
WCA countries have partnered with European countries for the purpose of
operating their maritime ports.30  However, these economic relationships
have been steadily deteriorating.31 As a result, African countries have
sought alternative commercial partners, developing relationships with Far
East Asian countries such as India, China, United Arab Emirates (Dubai),
and Singapore.32  Asian countries make up sixteen of the world’s twenty
container shippers.33  The increase in container traffic from Asia has
amplified “the imbalance between imports and containerizable exports
result[ing] in the export of a large number of empty containers and
contribut[ing] to increases in maritime freight rates in the region.”34  In
addition, the increasing number of mega-ships calling on Congolese ports
have exacerbated congestion and increased dwelling times for ships calling
at these ports.35
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continues to be a major obstacle to efficient port management.  Hance & Van Dongen, supra
note 1, at 45.
36. Hance & Van Dongen, supra note 1, at 11.
37. Id. at 21.
38. Id.  WCA maritime port management systems are modeled on colonial ones with
“[t]he institutional framework . . . depend[ing] primarily on its inheritance of either the
French or the British model.”  Id.
39. Id. 
40. See French Ports Change Their Structure, World Cargo News, Oct. 18, 2008,
available at http//www.worldcargonews.com.
41. Hance & Van Dongen, supra note 1, at 11.
42. Id. Under the British model “port authorities were also incorporated statutory public
bodies but usually enjoy[ed] a greater degree of autonomy. They usually were service ports.
The port agency entered more directly into landside port operations such as shore handling,
storage, or towage.”  Id.
43. See generally Conference on Trade and Development, Mar. 31, 2003, African Ports:
Reform and the Role of the Private Sector ¶ 48, tbl.10 (analyzing private sector participation
in port management reform in Africa). 
44. Copirep, a Congolese governmental agency, is preparing to reform all the publicly
owned companies.  See COPIREP, www.copirep.org (last visited Feb. 28, 2009). Laws on
III. MANAGEMENT OF CONGOLESE PORTS
The majority of African maritime ports are publicly owned and are
managed as public services—limiting the private sector, including global
operators, role in management.36 This management structure is modeled
after the traditional French approach établissement public.37 Also known
as the landlord model, établissement public ports  are managed by an
incorporated government agency.38  In France, the agency, which was in
charge of infrastructure, real estate (domaine), and marine services, was
regulated, to some degree by the French government.39  However, since
October 2008, the French government has initiated important reforms,
privatizing the management of its maritime ports.40  For example, Marseille,
Bordeaux, Nantes-Saint-Nazaire, La Rochelle, Le Havre, and Dunkerque
have become Grand Port Maritimes41— managed by a private entity and
regulated by the French government.42
Like France, many countries have had to engage in reforms to continue
to meet global expectations, as well as conditions imposed by European
Union partners and international financial institutions. While some WCA
countries, including, Senegal, Ghana, Benin, and Cameroon have success-
fully undertaken similar reforms, the DRC has not.43  The DRC’s failure to
take the measures necessary to transform its maritime port management
system has perpetuated centuries of poor management.44  Problems with the
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public enterprises were adopted and promulgated last year as part of the reform process.  Id.
45. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, arts. 2(1), 11,
1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
46. See id. art. 17; see also Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.) 1949 I.C.J. 4, 28 (Apr. 9).
47. GEORGE CC.KASOULIDOS,PORT STATE CONTROL AND JURISDICTION: EVOLUTION OF
THE PORT STATE REGIME 4-5 (1993).
48. Id. at 5.
49. International Convention Concerning The Regime of Navigable Waterways of
International Concern, Apr. 20, 1921, 7 L.N.T.S. 51; Convention on the International
Regime of Maritime Ports, Dec. 9, 1923, 58 L.N.T.S. 285 [hereinafter 1923 Ports
Convention]; Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958, 15
U.S.T. 1609, 516 U.N.T.S. 205; UNCLOS, supra note 45. 
management structure exacerbate the logistical problems outlined above.
Thus, reformation of these port’s management systems is essential to their
future ability to meet the expectations of the global market.
IV. PORT ACCESS AND PORT STATE SECURITY 
In addition to cost and efficiency, port access and port state security
have a significant impact on the number of ships that call at a particular
port.  Typically, maritime port operations are within the jurisdiction of the
port state.45  Under international customary law and the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), ships flying foreign flags
have a right of innocent passage—an exception to State sovereignty—
through a country’s territorial seas or internal waters.46  Innocent passage
does not, however, guarantee access to the ports of other states.  Neverthe-
less, “the commercial interest of states and the need for competitiveness
and communication have led to the present situation under which most of
the world’s maritime ports are open to international trade and traffic.”47
This is, however, “a reflection of common will between sovereign states,
and does not ensue from any customary obligations.”48 In short, without a
binding agreement the port state has no obligation to provide access to
foreign ships.  Thus, some port states entered into bilateral treaties of
commerce and navigation to ensure access and encourage trade.  
Such treaties are not a new phenomenon and several early attempts
were made to guarantee access to foreign maritime ports through bilateral
agreement.49  For example, the Convention and the International Regime of
Maritime Ports and Protocol of Signature (Regime of Maritime Ports
Convention) signed in 1923, provided parties access to other member
248 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14:2
50. The Convention  provided that:
Subject to the principle of reciprocity and to the reservation set out in the first
paragraph of Article 8, every Contracting State undertakes to grant the vessels of
every other Contracting State equality of treatment with its own vessels, or those of
any other State whatsoever, in the maritime ports situated under its sovereignty or
authority, as regards freedom of access to the port, the use of the port, and the full
employment of the benefits as regards navigation and commercial operations which
it affords to vessels, their cargoes and passengers. The equality of treatment thus
established shall cover facilities of all kinds, such as allocation of berths, loading and
unloading facilities, as well as dues and charges of all kinds levied in the name or for
the account of the Government, public authorities, concessionaries or undertakings
of any kind.
1923 Ports Convention, supra note 49, art. 2.
51. KASOULIDOS, supra note 47, at 3-4 (quoting DANIEL PATRICK O’CONNELL, THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA, Vol. II, at 84 (Ivan Anthony Shearer ed., 1984)).
52. UNCLOS, supra note 45, arts. 211(3), 25(1), (2).
states’ maritime ports.50  By ensuring port access, these early agreements
lead to long-standing trade relationships between the member states.  
Access under the Regime of Maritime Ports Convention, however, was
only guaranteed to member states.  Thus, there was no guarantee of access
to ports located in states, such as DRC, that were not parties to a treaty that
provided for port access.  This both discouraged ships from calling at these
ports and prevented these states from establishing long-term trade relations
with other countries.  This was resolved, in part, in 1994, when the
UNCLOS was entered in force.  Although UNCLOS does not explicitly
provide for access to member states’ ports, some interpret the Convention’s
landlocked country provisions as mandating that countries that open their
ports to international trade “open them at least to the parties to the
Convention, and arguably also to all comers on a non-discriminatory
basis.”51  Thus, it is possible that under UNCLOS all of the 145 member
states, including the DRC, are entitled to call at other member states’
maritime ports that are opened to international commerce and commercial
shipping.  This is an important development to international trade and
commerce; however, old habits die hard and countries that have long
established trade relations are more inclined to frequent each other’s ports.
Port State security also plays a central role in the number of ships that
call on a particular port.  The UNCLOS made it clear that coastal states
have jurisdiction over their maritime ports and are competent to issue
regulations related to the safety of the ports and the protection of the
environment.52 Since September 11, 2001, maritime security has been
dramatically increased to protect port operations and international trade.
For example, many states have adopted the International Ship and Port
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53. MPA, Circulars & Notices: Maritime Security – Amendments to SOLAS 74 Adopted
by the IMO Diplomatic Conference on Maritime Security Held in London in December
2002, http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/2004/29.html (last visited Mar. 9,
2009).
54. Memorandum from the Mar. and Underwater Sec. Consultants to the U.K. Comm.
on Transp. (Jan. 11, 2006), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm
200506/cmselect/cmtran/1026/6032918.htm.
55. See President’s Message, ONATRA, www.onatra.info (last visited Feb. 28, 2009).
56. In addition, Progosa has indicated that it is willing to subcontract Systra, a French
company, and Pricewaterhouse, a famous international office. See id.
57. Progosa, www.progosa.com (last visited Feb. 28, 2009).
58. Id.
Facility Code (ISPS Code) for security in maritime ports.53  However,
WCA states are facing constraints on enforcement of the ISPS Code,
impacting their ability to ensure security in their maritime ports.54 This
situation makes maritime trade between WCA countries and some
developed countries, such as the United States, which is strict in security
matters, difficult. 
V. ACCESSING RECENT CHANGES TO THE CONGOLESE MARITIME PORT
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
Recently the Congolese government has tried an alternative to
managing its ports, adopting a mixed management public-private
partnership.55 In December 2007, they hired Progosa, a Spanish company
specializing in the management of maritime ports, to work in conjunction
with Onatra.56  According to Progosa its mission is to improve the
management of Onatra.  Progosa proposes to accomplish its goal through
a “24-month consultancy contract [that] will be handled in partnership with
two internationally renowned sub-contractors: French company Systra, a
subsidiary of SNCF (French rail), and professional services firm
PricewaterhouseCoopers.”57  Although the first step in addressing many of
the issues facing the DRC ports is restructuring the management system,
the approach chosen by the Congolese government may not be the most
effective solution.  
The primary reason that this approach is unlikely to work is that it does
not provide for any new investments in the DRC ports.   It does not appear
that Progosa, or any of the consulting agencies, intend to invest capital in
Onatra.58  Furthermore, their participation may place an additional burden
on Onatra’s already limited financial resources.  For example, it remains to
be seen how Progosa will be compensated, and without outside capital
250 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14:2
59. Id.
60. Luc Mabiala, L'Onatra s'elance sous la conduite de l'Adg Claude Pecune dans la
consolidation de ses relations avec ses partenaires prives, Digitialcongo.net Jan. 31, 2009,
http://www.digitalcongo.net/article/56237.
61. See Onatra: les agents reclament le depart de l'ADG et du PCA, RADIO OKAPI
(Kinshasa, DRC), Apr. 12, 2009,  available at http://www.radiookapi.net/index.php?i=53
&a=22928. 
Onatra will have to compensate them.59  As the state owned enterprise is
already under significant financial stress, bankruptcy may be the end result
of such an arrangement. Furthermore, without new investments to fund
improvements in the infrastructure, as well as the technical and logistical
operations of Congolese ports, it is unlikely this partnership will achieve
the desired outcome.
The success of the Progosa/Onatra partnership is currently being
evaluated. The Onatra Labor Union, contending that Progosa did not
provide any real expertise and exploited Onatra, has asked the Congolese
Parliament to revise the contract.60  To the contrary, Progosa argues that it
has improved the financial situation of Onatra and is trying to solve the
delay in the payment of the salaries of employees.61
Although the success of the Progosa/Onatra partnership remains to be
seen, long-term stabilization and improvement will require a management
system that encourages the flow of new investments in order to renew the
ports’ infrastructures.  This can be achieved through a complete or partial
privatization, a joint-venture company, or a landlord management model.
Privatization of the Congolese maritime ports is likely to be the most
effective solution.  Private investors will be able to bring capital and fund
development and renewal of infrastructures, as well as the management
skills necessary to compete in the global market.  In addition, privatization
of the DRC’s three ports by different investors will incentivize best
management practices by encouraging competition between the ports.
VI. CONCLUSION
Congolese maritime ports built in the early twentieth century have not
adapted to modern maritime transport.  The war that has ravaged the DRC
for more than a decade has fostered a culture of mismanagement and
corruption that has resulted in the decline of it economy.  However, after
the elections held in 2006 the DRC is on a path towards positive change.
In light of these changes, the Congolese government should take the
opportunity to completely privatize port management.  Private actors can
provide for the management skills, investments, and infrastructures
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necessary to meet the growing demands of global maritime transport
activities.  This is the only way for the Congolese maritime ports to meet
the needs of the global market, which require decreasing the cost of
maritime operations and increasing efficiency.  Congolese maritime ports
can only begin to satisfy these requirements if they are privatized and if the
private actors bring new investments to the sector. 
Although privatization is likely the solution to many of the issues
facing Congolese ports, selecting private investors has to be done in
accordance with norms of competitiveness and transparency to ensure that
they comport with the law of procurement and to avoid corruption from the
governmental institution in charge of the transaction.  It will also be
necessary to reform the legal status of Onatra in order to allow private
investment in the maritime port sector and confine the government’s role
to that of regulator.  Once corruption and capital have been addressed,
privatization of the Congolese maritime ports will certainly improve
maritime ports operations by providing additional capital for the updated
infrastructure and equipment necessary to avoid chronic delays for loading
and unloading operations, address congestion, and avoid high surcharges.
